I actually study physics :D

that's partly why I care about making the distinction between science and non-science. To be scientific, a theory needs to be, first and foremost, falsifiable. That sounds counterintuitive, but you need to propose experiments that could prove you wrong. And then if they fail, you got a good indication you might be on to something.

A (good enough, as you said) simulation is per definition unfalsifiable. It's also a wild assumption that "the real world" obeys the same laws of physics ours does, and I consider any statistical argument based on that assumption to be pretty unconvincing.

Ultimately, the simulation theory is a nice thought experiment and a great setpiece for sci-fi, but not much more. It's kinda similar to the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, actually. Cool to think about, not at all relevant for us.

This is basically what many eastern philosophies say. In Budism they fully admitted to the inability to prove the reality of one's existence. At the same time talking about the importance of engagement with reality.

Basically reality exists because we are here to perceive its existence.

Lmao I realized after I posted that that it was gonna open a bit of a philosophical can of worms, and that I would quickly be neck deep. This is a very good point, and I only meant my statement to a certain extent. For the average human's daily life, finding out that free will doesnt exist (to whichever extent you'd like to take an idea like that) wouldnt suddenly change their daily experience, and they would be able to continue to operate under the assumption that they are making meaningful choices with varied outcomes just like usual. They had this impression before the revelation that free will is not real, so their life experiences would not necessarily change after the fact (obviously it COULD change, but wouldnt as a necessity). As for the more nuanced moral implications of such a discovery/revelation, I shouldnt presume to know how that would impact the world.

That only follows if you believe that free will implies moral responsibility, and that moral responsibility means punishment must occur, and that that means more punishment must occur. Why doesn't moral responsibility mean less punishment? What about the moral responsibility of those meting out punishment?

And in either case, both concepts are intangible and immeasurable, so using them as justification for something as consequential as imprisonment means something else much more tangible and measurable is being hidden behind those concepts.

I think it's just the exercise of power. That's why moral responsibility is only ever used to punish and never to stay punishment, because those wielding the argument aren't interested in those arguments being used to limit their power, only to exercise it.

The only thing that matters is effectiveness to reduce harm, and that is basically never spoken about by those in favour of incarceration.

But, why? Even if free will is proven, what value does punishment serve? And if all things are predetermined, then punishment itself is justified by predeterminism.

Like a dream, you are just me. The floor I walk is me. The air I breathe is me. Everyone I meet, everything I feel, is just me. Nothing is real except I.