this post was submitted on 10 Jul 2023
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This issue is already quite widely publicized and quite frankly "we're handling it and removing this" is a much more harmful response than I would hope to see. Especially as the admins of that instance have not yet upgraded the frontend version to apply the urgent fix.

It's not like this was a confidential bug fix, this is a zero day being actively exploited. Please be more cooperative and open regarding these issues in your own administration if you're hosting an instance. 🙏

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[–] SeeJayEmm@lemmy.procrastinati.org 25 points 1 year ago (2 children)

I strongly disagree with some of your points.

Yes, the vulnerability is out there. Maybe the root cause actually introduced a LOT of vulnerabilities. The fix is being pushed at a frantic pace. To expect the devs to take time out of the mad rush to notify those impacted to do a proper writeup is just insanity.

It's not insanity. It's called incident management and it's something the development team needs to build a proper procedure around, given the expanded scope of this project. I agree that the devs working on identifying, mitigating, and fixing the vulnerability should not be expected to also handle the communication. They need to designate someone for that role.

A 0-day was actively being exploited in the wild. There was confusion, misinformation, and a general lack of information.

You need to:

  • Indicate that you are aware of an ongoing problem and are working to identify it. This let's people know there is an issue and that you're aware of it. You can do this without giving specific details on how to replicate the exploit. This includes server admins publicly acknowledging that they are aware of the issue and will provide updates when they have them, to alleviate the concerns of their user base.
  • Once a mitigation are known, you publish that, in as many channels as you need to get that information out to the people who need it. So that server admins are aware of what they need to do to reduce their risk.
  • Once a fix is in place, you publish that, same as above.

The way I see it? This (hopefully) got fixed pretty much instantly and there is active work to get the fix applied by the people who need to apply it. That is what should be done.

And how do you know this since it's not been communicated? Most of the information I (as a person running a lemmy server) have been able to glean is from random threads spread across random communities.

Give it a week or two to see how they handle the public disclosure side of things.

A couple of weeks for a postmortem. Sure. A couple of weeks for an active, in the wild, 0-day, to officially communicate that the problem exists and how to mitigate/patch it. Absolutely not. I still don't see a security alert on the GitHub telling me I should be updating to to patch an active exploit and it's been how many hours now?

[–] fuser@quex.cc 2 points 1 year ago (1 children)

whilst I differ somewhat on sharing information on the exploit - knowing something about what was going on allowed some instance admins to take evasive steps - I agree with you completely that there could be a better channel for coordinating communication - I imagine a lot of the discussion went on via Matrix - under the circumstances the response wasn't so bad given the complete lack of formal organization but yes, it definitely could be improved - you sound quite well-versed in how to handle security/critical incidents. Maybe consider contacting the devs and offering them some help in this area?

[–] SeeJayEmm@lemmy.procrastinati.org 3 points 1 year ago (1 children)

I don't think I'm asking for a lot. A post on !lemmy@lemmy.ml xposted to !lemmy_support@lemmy.ml that gets pinned to the top. Edit the post when relevant information comes out. Release a security advisory on github as soon as you have enough info to warrant one and keep it up-to-date as well.

I'm not asking for the troubleshooting to happen out in the open.

you sound quite well-versed in how to handle security/critical incidents. Maybe consider contacting the devs and offering them some help in this area?

I know enough. I'm certainly not an infosec guy I'm just a sysadmin who's been doing this long enough to know what should be done. At least partly due to this there's currently 400 open issues just in lemmy-ui on github. Right now I think the best most of us can do is wait for the dust to settle.

[–] fuser@quex.cc 2 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (1 children)

Right, but Lemmy.ml is really just one of a thousand plus instances. We need something instance independent or a way to propagate info that doesn't rely on any single failure points, or Lemmy as the communication channel. What happens when lemmy.ml is down, or if no instances are able to post due to concerted DoS?

It's impossible to stop anyone randomly posting stuff on Lemmy. Attackers can post misinformation as well, especially if they compromise admin accounts. Who are we gonna trust in the midst of the next incident? The account posting most prolifically about the UI exploit in progress was using a burner account that had just been created to post about it. I'm sure there were good reasons for wanting to be anonymous when discussing the work of unknown malicious actors, but it made me think twice about what was being posted at the time.

[–] SeeJayEmm@lemmy.procrastinati.org 2 points 1 year ago (1 children)

I think the authoritative source should be the GitHub repo. A security advisory should be posted there with references to outside resources as necessary.

[–] fuser@quex.cc 1 points 1 year ago

checks all the boxes - authoritative (authenticated user accounts), central location, not on fediverse, already relatively well-known by lemmy users and provides visibility to remediation. It's a good idea.