Skimming through the giant wall of gibberish the crux seems to be about feeling depressed after a series of one night stands that the author apparently thought would be longer term relationships.
I would suggest that if this has become a regular occurrence for the author it suggests there's a problem with their approach to dating. Maybe don't go looking for long term relationships at bars and clubs, or hookup focused "dating" apps.
That would run face first into proprietary info and corporate classified info.
Behold all the fucks I do not give. If it's that critical they lose all claim to being proprietary. It's just like patent, there's no such thing as a secret patent, so anything that safety critical doesn't get to stay secret either.
Regulation won't detail what a company does to that level. They might say something like "fasteners shouldn't come loose" but it wouldn't have a torque spec.
It doesn't now but it's utterly trivial to fix that. Just make the regulations say that components must meet the manufacturer specifications and require manufacturers to publish and maintain all the specifications of all safety critical components. If they want to keep it secret then that means it's not safety critical and they're responsible for any accidents resulting from its failure.
It's OK for manufacturers to say using aftermarket parts voids the warranty, it's not OK for them to prevent using them entirely. Likewise if there's a safety concern that should be handled by regulation and things like safety inspections, not by forcing all repairs to go through the manufacturer. If whatever it is is that critical to the safe operation it should be publicly documented so that third parties can manufacture it correctly to the needed tolerances.
It's because layering doesn't really gain you anything so it only has downsides. It's important to differentiate encryption and hashing from here on since the dangers are different.
With hashing, layering different hashing algorithms can lead to increased collision chance and if done wrong a reduced entropy (for instance hashing a 256 bit hash with a 16 bit hashing algorithm). Done correctly it's probably fine and in fact rehashing a hash with the same algorithm is standard practice, but care should be taken.
With encryption things get much worse. When layering encryption algorithms a flaw in one can severely compromise them all. Presumably you're using the same secret across them all. If the attacker has a known piece of input or can potentially control the input a variety of potential attack vectors open up. If there's a flaw in one of the algorithms used that can make the process of extracting the encryption key much easier. Often times the key is more valuable than any single piece of input because keys are often shared across many encrypted files or data streams.
Banks usually have the absolute worst password policies. It's typically because their backend is some crusty mainframe from the 80s that limits inputs to something absurdly insecure by today's standards and they've kicked the upgrade can down the road for so long now that it's a staggeringly monumental task to rewrite it all. Thankfully most of them have upgraded at this point, but every now and then you still find one that's got ridiculous limits like a maximum password length of 8 and only alphanumeric characters (with no 2FA obviously).
Trimming whitespace from the start and end of a password is fine but you absolutely should not remove whitespace from the middle of a password.
The rest of that sentence is important. Hashing passwords is the minimum practice, not best practice. You should always be at least hashing passwords. Best practice would be salting and peppering them as well as picking a strong hashing function with as high a number of iterations as you can support. You would then pair that with 2FA (not SMS based), and a minimum password length of 16 with no maximum length.
A KDF is not reversible so it's not encryption (a bad one can be brute forced or have a collision, but that's different from decrypting it even if the outcome is effectively the same). As long as you're salting (and ideally peppering) your passwords and the iteration count is sufficiently high, any sufficiently long password will be effectively unrecoverable via any known means (barring a flaw being found in the KDF).
The defining characteristic that separates hashing from encryption is that for hashing there is no inverse function that can take the output and one or more extra parameters (secrets, salts, etc.) and produce the original input, unlike with encryption.
That's a pepper not a salt. A constant value added to the password that's the same for every user is a pepper and prevents rainbow table attacks. A per-user value added is a salt and prevents a number of things, but the big one is being able to overwrite a users password entry with another known users password (perhaps with a SQL injection).
Hashing passwords isn't even best practice at this point, it's the minimally acceptable standard.
Which shouldn't even matter because passwords are salted and hashed before storing them, so you're not actually saving anything. At least they better be. If you're not hashing passwords you've got a much bigger problem than low complexity passwords.
Remember huffing? Pepperidge Farms remembers.